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Abstract  
Ad hoc networks is vulnerable to numerous number of attacks due to its infrastructure-less 
nature, one of these attacks is the Sybil attack. Sybil attack is a severe attack on vehicular 
ad hoc networks (VANET) in which the intruder maliciously claims or steals multiple 
identities and use these identities to disturb the functionality of the VANET network by 
disseminating false identities. Many solutions have been proposed in order to defense the 
VANET network against the Sybil attack. In this research a hybrid algorithm is proposed, 
by combining footprint and privacy-preserving detection of abuses of pseudonyms 
(P2DAP) methods. The hybrid detection algorithm is implemented using the ns2 simulator. 
The proposed algorithm is working as follows, P2DAP acting better than footprint when 
the number of vehicles increases. On the other hand, the footprint algorithm acting better 
when the speed of vehicles increases. The hybrid algorithm depends on encryption, 
authentication and on the trajectory of the vehicle. The scenarios will be generated using 
SUMO and MOVE tools. 
Keywords— Ad hoc networks, Mobile ad hoc networks, Vehicular ad hoc networks, Sybil 
attack 
Introduction  
VANET is a subgroup of Mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) in which the nodes are 
vehicles [1, 2]. VANETs are able to provide the communication between vehicles and 
infrastructure by a Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) [3, 4]. However, VANET is 
vulnerable to different types of attacks [5, 6], Such as the Sybil attack, in which the intruder 
fabricates the identities of multiple vehicles [7]. The communication between entities in VANET 
is done through radio waves, and these waves contain a lot of private and sensitive information 
for applications, personal information of drivers and travelers. This information could be used to 
enhance roads safety and provide a comfortable driving for drivers. In the other hand, this 
information must be secured against intruders. 
VANET network has three main system components which are the application unit (AU), 
on-board unite (OBU) and Road Side Units (RSU) [8]: 
• Smart vehicle: Vehicles in VANET networks are equipped with OBU which is 
responsible on networking, processing, and determine vehicles locations and rout 
directions. Application unit (AU): This component is responsible many applications such 
as driver and vehicle safety by working as a warning device for safety application, also it 
works as a navigator for communication applications [9] 
• On-Board unit: This device is used to make the inter-vehicle communication (V2V) and 
infrastructure to vehicles communication (V2R) [8]. This device is also used to 
communicate several types of message including safety oriented messages [9] 
• Roadside unit (RSU): this device is physically located on fixed locations, such as traffic 
lights [9]. This device is used to expand communication range for the VANET network 
by exchanging messages with OBU’s and broadcast important information to entities in 
its range, communicate with other RSU’s, running safety application and provide OBU’s 
with internet connection [8]. 
The infrastructure-less nature of VANET [10] and using broadcasting to transmit 
message, makes it vulnerable to different types of attacks [11, 12] such as Impersonation attacks 
[13], False attribute possession [14], Replay attack [15, 16], Tunneling attack [16], Message 
tampering [15], ID disclosure [17, 18] and the Sybil attack [19] in which the intruder fakes 
multiple identities [20]. This paper focuses on the Sybil attacks in VANETS. 
Sybil node forges several identities such as pretending to be a police car, stealing vehicles 
identities or creating new identities. Sybil attack is a dangerous attack on VANET network 
because the attacker could initiate different types of attacks such as DoS attack to ruin 
communication between entities in the VANET network [1, 21]. Also, Sybil node could fabricate 
traffic jam in order to force other vehicles to take other routes. In addition, Sybil node could 
inject false information in the network and may put the life of passengers in danger [22]. 
Number of schemes have been proposed to detect and prevent Sybil attacks [5]. These 
schemes can be categorized into three classes: (1) resource testing, (2) position verification, and 
(3) encryption and authentication. Resource testing is based on counting the number of resources 
the node has such as its computing ability, communication bandwidth and so on [23, 24]. This 
scheme is considered inadequate to VANET since the smart vehicle can fabricate having more 
resources. Position verification, depends on linking one position with one identity. This scheme 
has many solutions. These solutions are discussed later. This research focuses on the encryption 
and authentication category that based on authentication mechanism and public key 
cryptography. 
This research performs a Hybrid algorithm for the footprint and P2DAP schemes, by 
simulating this new hybrid scheme using ns2 simulator and generate the scenarios using special 
tools SUMO and MOVE tools. The rest of this paper is organized as follows; section II presents 
related work regarding Sybil attack detection schemes. Section III, discuss the proposed hybrid 
algorithms. Section IV, will evaluate the performance of the hybrid detection schemes. And 
finally, section V will conclude the paper. 
Related work 
In ad hoc network, Sybil attack detection schemes are classified into three classes, radio 
resource testing, identity registration and position verification based, and finally encryption and 
cryptography based schemes [23]. 
Radio resource testing 
The first category is resource testing which is depends on the number of resources the 
node has, but in vehicular ad hoc network this category is inadequate, therefore, the malicious 
node can fake having more resources than legitimate node can have [25]. 
Identity registration and position verification 
The second category is the position based category, this scheme is depends on linking 
one identity with one position, if the identity have more than one position then it might be a 
Sybil node [26]. Number of schemes has been proposed according to this scheme [27]. 
In [25] the authors proposed a scheme that is called Active Security through Seeing 
(PASS). There scheme depends on radars. In this scheme the radars are acting as the “eye” of the 
system, if the radar can see the node then it is exist, otherwise it is not. Although the 
transmission range of the radar is low, the nodes can exchange the information with the 
neighboring vehicles. In this scheme the authors assume that 85% of nodes are legitimate nodes 
which it is considered as a drawback. Also this approach suffers from long communication 
delays and long response time in addition to other potential security issues. 
In [28] the authors proposed a scheme called tunable radar, which is an improvement on 
the previous scheme. By using the tunable radar instead of the static radar range, the range of 
radar can be changed by changing the sampling rate of the radar. The advantages of this scheme 
are to enhance the efficiency of detecting positions and also prevent potential position attacks in 
a local cell compared to PASS. 
In [27] the authors proposed a solution that is called signal strength which depends on the 
signals that are captured by other vehicles in the network. In this scheme the nodes are classified 
into three classes’ verifier, claimer and witness. A claimer periodically sends a beacon message 
that contains a claimed position. A witness node gathers the claimers beacon messages and 
estimates the position for each claimed node depending on the signal strength. A verifier node 
collects all received signal strength from the claimer nodes if the difference between the 
estimated position and the claimed position is large then it is a suspicious node. 
Defenses based on encryption and authentication 
These schemes depend on encrypting and decrypting the messages between vehicles, 
using symmetric, asymmetric, hash function or digital certificates [29] [30]. These schemes also 
ensure to link one position with one identity [5]. The following schemes are following under this 
category: 
In [31] the authors proposed a scheme called footprint this scheme depends on the 
trajectory (path) of the vehicle to identify the vehicles. When a vehicle passes by an RSU, the 
RSU issues an authorization message to the vehicle, which is an evidence to prove that this 
vehicle passed by this RSU. 
In [32] the authors proposed two schemes in their research depending on the type of the 
certificate. In their schemes they aim to reduce the system architecture requirements and the cost 
of the computational certificate managements. They also aim to make their schemes able to be 
deployed in an-early stage VANET. The components of their scheme are certificate authority 
(CA) and RSUs. The RSU is accountable on releasing the RSUs public keys certificates. This 
solution is depends on “the timestamp series certificate approach and the temporary certificate 
approach” [23], which are described as follows: 
Series of timestamp certificate approach: A certificate that contains a current timestamp 
is generated by each RSU in the network. Each vehicle passes by an RSU will gain a certificate 
that contains the current timestamp, and according to this the vehicles will gain a series of 
timestamp certificates. The Sybil node can be detected if two vehicles have the same timestamps, 
because it is unlikely that two vehicles pass by a sequence of RSUs with the same timestamps. 
This approach will work in an inefficient way when applying in an urban environment and this is 
because of two challenges. The first challenge is the complexity of the roads. The second 
challenge is that in urban environment the road has many intersections and vehicles tend to slow 
down or stop at these intersections, so vehicles are likely to have similar timestamps, which will 
make Sybil node detection difficult. The solution to this issue is to deploy RSUs on the edges. 
Temporary certificate approach: Each RSU generates key pairs on a temporary basis to 
be valid for a short period of time. A vehicle should be authenticated by an RSU in order to get 
the first certificate, after that, the vehicle regenerate its key pair and certificate with the following 
RSU resulting in a chained certificate. With this approach, the chances of detecting a Sybil node 
are higher when compared to the other approach that depends on one certificate at a time. 
In [33] the authors proposed a scheme called “privacy-preserving detection of abuses of 
pseudonyms” (P2DAP). The system scheme components are the Department of Motor Vehicle 
(DMV) and Road Side Boxes (RSBs) which are the same as RSUs in previous schemes. RSBs 
are securely connected to the DMV via a backhaul wired network. Their scheme based on the 
assumption that DMV will yearly generates an adequate number of pseudonyms for all vehicles; 
these generated pseudonyms will be hashed in two steps, the first step using a one-way global 
key Kc; and this key will be distributed to all RSBs in the network, then from the hashed 
pseudonyms they selected a set of bits these selected bits are called “coarse-grained hash value”, 
the pseudonyms are then organized according to these bits into groups, these groups are called 
“coarse-grained group”. Afterwards these groups will be hashed again using another one-way 
key Kf known only by the DMV, and then group these pseudonyms according to selected bits 
“fine grained hash value” into “fine-grained group”. Each fine-grained group will be allocated to 
one vehicle. The Sybil attack detection will be done in two levels. First, RSBs overhear the 
message exchange and puts the used pseudonyms in a list; then the RSBs start to calculate the 
“course-grained hash value” for each event, if there are two vehicles or more are in the same 
“course-grained group” then it might be a Sybil attack. Therefore, the RSB will send a report to 
the DMV. Afterward the DMV will hash these suspicious pseudonyms using the Kc and then 
using the Kf, if these pseudonyms are in the same “fine-grained group” then they are Sybil 
nodes, otherwise it is a false alarm. 
Proposed algorithm  
In order to increase the performance and detection rate a hybrid algorithm is proposed to 
detect Sybil attacks. As mentioned before, P2DAP works better when the vehicle speed 
increases, while footprint works better with a larger number of nodes. Taking advantage of these 
results anew hybrid algorithm is proposed. 
Proposed algorithm components 
In VANET network, the communication between moving vehicles is happened via inter-vehicle 
communication and between vehicles and RSUs via Roadside-to-vehicle communications. 
Figure 1 shows the system components, which are (1) the smart vehicle, which is contained of 
on-board unit (OBU). (2) Road side units (RSU) which is responsible in providing the vehicles 
that passes by them with link-tags, provide the vehicles with their pseudonyms, ethically 
eavesdropping on the communication overhead and send a report to the DMV in the case of a 
suspicious event occurs. (3) Trust authority (TA) which is responsible for instituting trust among 
entities. (4) Department of motors and vehicles (DMV), which generates pseudonyms for 
vehicles yearly, grouping the pseudonyms and check whether the suspicious event whether it is a 
Sybil attack or a false alarm. 
 
Figure 1: Proposed algorithm components 
The proposed algorithm is a combination between two methodologies: these 
methodologies are in the same class which is the encryption and cryptography class, that’s mean 
these methodologies are using encryption, decryption, public key and hash functions. In section 
3.2 a description on how the proposed algorithm will work: 
P2DAP algorithm 
The proposed algorithm is a combination of two methodologies the first one is P2DAP. In which 
each vehicle will own a number of pseudonyms, the pseudonyms are provided yearly by the 
DMV. The generated pseudonyms will be hashed using a one-way global key kc, using a hash 
function called SHA1 [34]. This key will be distributed to all RSUs in the network. Number of 
bits is selected from these hashed pseudonyms; these selected bits are called “coarse-grained 
hash value”. Afterwards the pseudonyms are grouped into groups according to these bits and 
called “coarse-grained hash group”. Then these new groups are hashed again using one-way key 
called kf, but this key is not distributed to RSUs. It will be known only by the DMV. Then these 
groups will be grouped according to the selected bits called “fine-grained group”. Each “fine 
group” is assigned to one vehicle. 
Afterwards, the generated pseudonyms will be distributed to vehicles; these pseudonyms 
are also called “secure plate number” in order to keep the privacy of the drivers no entity can link 
between the pseudonyms and the owner of the vehicle or the driver of the vehicle. Next the 
DMV will broadcast the kc to RSUs in the network in order to check whether there is a 
suspicious event or not. 
This algorithm will work on a case that the speed of the vehicles is lower than the speed 
threshold the speed threshold in this experiment was 40 km/h, which is determined by the street 
administration according to the street nature and length. 
Sybil attack detection is done by the following steps: first the RSU will overhear the 
communication overhead and hence the exchange messages are signed by the pseudonyms that 
are generated by the DMV and the kc is known by the RSUs, RSUs will calculate the “coarse 
grained groups” by using the broadcasted key kc, if two or more pseudonyms are in the same 
coarse grained group then a suspicious event is occurring, therefore, the RSU will send a report 
that contains the suspicious pseudonyms. Afterwards, the DMV will check if these pseudonyms 
are in the same “fine-grained hash group”, if yes then a Sybil attack is happening consequently it 
will send a report to the RSU to terminate the attack. If the suspicious pseudonyms are not in the 
same “fine grained group”, then a false alarm is happening and no action will be done. Figure 2 
summarizes the deployment stage of the P2DAP algorithm. 
 Figure 2: P2DAP algorithm flowchart 
Footprint algorithm 
The second algorithm is the footprint. This algorithm depends on the trajectory of the 
vehicle to check whether it is a Sybil node or a genuine node [1]. 
To check the trajectory of the vehicle, each vehicle will have a series of link-tags that is 
obtained by each RSU that is passing by. Thus, the vehicles will have a series of link-tags. 
The Sybil attack detection will be done by checking this series of link-tags, if two 
vehicles have the same series of link-tags then a Sybil attack is happening, and the RSU will 
immediately terminate the attack. Otherwise the vehicles are genuine and no Sybil attack is 
happening. 
The deployment stage of this algorithm is done as follows: Each RSU will detect the 
neighboring RSUs, each RSU will generate a link-tag to the current timestamp, then it will 
broadcast these link-tags to other RSUs, the broadcasted link-tag is signed by the RSU, 
afterwards RSUs will send link-tags to TA for authorization, each vehicle will pass by an RSU 
will obtain a link-tag from the passing by RSU. Figure 3 illustrates this algorithm. This algorithm 
will always be running therefore the link-tags must be in a serial order to clarify the trajectory of 
the vehicle. 
 
Figure 3: footprint flowchart 
Hybrid algorithm 
The proposed scheme is a hybrid algorithm between P2DAP and footprint, when the 
speed is increased over the threshold footprint will be applied, otherwise P2DAP will be applied. 
At the beginning, the proposed algorithm must be deployed in the streets. Thus, DMV 
will yearly generate pseudonyms to all vehicles in the network. Then it will hash these 
pseudonyms in one-way hash function using a global key kc. Thereafter the hashed pseudonyms 
will be grouped according to selected bits called “coarse-grained hash values” and these groups 
are called “coarse-grained groups”, afterwards, these groups will be hashed using a local key 
called kf. Then the global key kc will be distributed to all RSUs in the system. And pseudonyms 
will be distributed to the vehicles in the network according to the “fine-grained values” each 
“fine-grained group” will be assigned to one vehicle. Subsequently, each RSU will generate a 
link-tag that is signed by it, these link-tags are authorized by the TA, and broadcast there link-
tags to the neighboring RSUs in order to identify itself and its signature to the other neighboring 
RSUs in the network. 
Figure 4 illustrates the hybrid algorithm. First, it will detect the vehicles on the streets, 
each vehicle will obtain the deployment information from the nearest RSU, these information 
will be authorized by the RSUs, afterwards, the RSUs will check the average speed of the 
vehicles on the street, if the speed is exceeded the threshold which is 40 km/h; the speed 
threshold could be varied based on several factors such as the maximum speed of the street, the 
street length and the number of vehicles in the street, the footprint algorithm will run to check if 
there is a Sybil attack or not, by checking the link-tags for the passing vehicles if they are valid 
and there are no similarities among them, if there is no similarity among them then there are no 
attacks detected, otherwise, the RSU will terminate the attack. Thereafter, the proposed 
algorithm will recheck the streets again to check the average speed of the vehicles. Otherwise the 
P2DAP algorithm will run to determine whether there is a Sybil attack or not. First the RSU will 
overhear the message exchanging in the network, each message is signed by the pseudonym of 
the vehicle. The nearest RSU will hash the existing pseudonyms using the global key kf, if two 
or more pseudonyms are in the same “coarse-grained hash group”, then a suspicious event is 
occurring, then the RSU will send a report to the DMV to check whether these pseudonyms are 
in the same “fine-grain group”, if yes then a Sybil attack is occurring otherwise, it is a false 
alarm. 
 
Figure 4: Hybrid algorithm flow chart 
Performance evaluation 
The hybrid algorithm is simulated using ns-2 version 2.35. Ten different scenarios have 
been generated using MOVE and SUMO tools. The street length is 300m, Simulation time is 900 
seconds and the routing protocol is AODV. Details of the simulation parameters are presented in 
Table I.  
Each scenario is simulated using the ns2 simulator and each scenario took 900s. The 
hybrid algorithm is written using a TCL script. As mentioned before the proposed algorithm is a 
combination of two algorithms the first one is footprint and the second one is P2DAP. In order to 
detect if there is a Sybil attack in the network, one of these two algorithms will be running 
according to the speed condition of the vehicles. Footprint will always be running in order to 
keep the link-tags in a sequential order. But the proposed algorithm will follow the speed 
condition to count the number of detected Sybil attackers, if the speed exceeded the threshold 
which is determined in the performance evaluation to 40 km/h; the reason of choosing this 
threshold is the length of the street which is 300m, if the streets are longer the speed threshold 
will increase. The P2DAP algorithm will run otherwise the footprint algorithm will keep 
running. 
Table I Parameters used in the simulation 
Simulation Parameters Value 
Simulation time 900s 
Routing protocol AODV 
Length of road 300m 
Number of lanes 2 
Number of RSUs/RSBs 4 
link layer type LL 
MAC type Mac/802_11 
Number of attackers 5 
The nodes are defined into four types: Authorized vehicles, malicious vehicle (attacker), 
(RSB in P2DAP, RSU in footprint) and (DMV in P2DAP, TA in footprint). Figure 5 illustrates 
the simulation map, which is generated using MOVE and SUMO tools. 
 Figure: Simulation map 
As it shown in table II, the proposed algorithm is simulated using 10 scenarios, each 
scenario is simulated on each speed, and then the average of the detection rate result was taken. 
The detection rate is estimated by collecting the number of detected attackers, each detected 
attacker will increase the detection rate 20%. The results show that the detection rate of the 
hybrid algorithm is higher than using the P2DAP and footprint algorithms alone, furthermore the 
results have a positive relationship with the speed, the P2DAP detection rate is less than the 
footprint when applying alone. When a hybrid algorithm is applied the detection rate for the 
Sybil attack is increased, when the speed increases the detection rate is increased. Hence the 
footprint scheme must be always working; therefore, the link-tag that is obtained to vehicles by 
RSUs must be in a sequential order, therefore, in the simulation the repeated attackers that are 
captured by the footprint algorithm while the P2DAP algorithm is running are removed. Figure 6 
illustrates the results of simulating the proposed algorithm. 
 
Table II: simulation results 
Speed Footprint P2DAP hybrid 
20km/h 46% 42% 48% 
40km/h 48% 44% 50% 
60km/h 50% 44% 52% 
80km/h 50% 48% 52% 
 
 
Figure 6: Detection rate for speed varying 
Conclusion 
In this paper a Hybrid algorithm is proposed to detect the Sybil attack. This algorithm is a 
combination between P2DAP and footprint algorithms, when the speed increases footprint 
algorithm will be applied to detect the Sybil attack, otherwise the P2DAP will detect the Sybil 
attack. The results show that the detection rate is increased when applying the hybrid algorithm. 
The proposed algorithm faces some challenges which are the speed threshold that is not fixed yet 
and need more research about the streets nature, one other challenge is the algorithm code, which 
is written by a TCL script, which making the enhancement on the algorithm a bit harder than 
using a structured language such as C++ or JAVA languages. 
Future work 
In the future, improvements on the proposed algorithm will be done; first of all, the 
algorithm will be coded using object-oriented language not a TCL script, therefore, the 
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improvement on the algorithm will be applied easily in the future. Also, the optimal speed 
threshold will be studied based on different factors such as the street nature, the number of nodes 
in the street and the number of lanes. 
References 
1. Hamdan, S., R.S. Al-Qassas, and S. Tedmori, Comparative Study on Sybil Attack 
Detection Schemes. International Journal of Computers and Technology, 2015. 14: p. 
5869-5876. 
2. Dabboussi, A., et al., Analyzing the reliability for connected vehicles using qualitative 
approaches and quantitative methods, in Safety and Reliability–Safe Societies in a 
Changing World. 2018, CRC Press. p. 2603-2610. 
3. Qian, Y. and N. Moayeri. Design of secure and application-oriented VANETs. in 
Vehicular Technology Conference, 2008. VTC Spring 2008. IEEE. 2008. IEEE. 
4. Zhao, Z., et al., Mobility Prediction-Assisted Over-The-Top Edge Prefetching for 
Hierarchical VANETs. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 2018. 
5. Newsome, J., et al. The sybil attack in sensor networks: analysis & defenses. in 
Proceedings of the 3rd international symposium on Information processing in sensor 
networks. 2004. ACM. 
6. Jain, M. and R. Saxena. VANET: Security Attacks, Solution and Simulation. in 
Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Computational Intelligence and 
Informatics. 2018. Springer. 
7. Rawat, A., S. Sharma, and R. Sushil, VANET: Security attacks and its possible solutions. 
Journal of Information and Operations Management, 2012. 3(1): p. 301. 
8. Al-Sultan, S., et al., A comprehensive survey on vehicular Ad Hoc network. Journal of 
network and computer applications, 2014. 37: p. 380-392. 
9. Aboobaker, A.K.K., Performance analysis of authentication protocols in vehicular ad 
hoc networks (VANET). Master of Science Thesis, Department of Mathematics, 
University of London, September, 2010. 2. 
10. Patel, A. and P. Kaushik, Improving QoS of VANET Using Adaptive CCA Range and 
Transmission Range both for Intelligent Transportation System. Wireless Personal 
Communications, 2018. 100(3): p. 1063-1098. 
11. Sabahi, F. The Security of Vehicular Adhoc Networks. in Computational Intelligence, 
Communication Systems and Networks (CICSyN), 2011 Third International Conference 
on. 2011. IEEE. 
12. Alasmary, W. and W. Zhuang, Mobility impact in IEEE 802.11 p infrastructureless 
vehicular networks. Ad Hoc Networks, 2012. 10(2): p. 222-230. 
13. Rai, A.K., R.R. Tewari, and S.K. Upadhyay, Different types of attacks on integrated 
MANETInternet communication. International Journal of Computer Science and 
Security, 2010. 4(3): p. 265- 274. 
14. Porwal, V. and R. Patel, A survey of VANETs: The Platform for Vehicular Networking 
Applications. international journal of advanced research in computer engineering & 
technology, 2014. 3(8): p.2801-2805. 
15. Dhamgaye, A. and N. Chavhan, Survey on security challenges in VANET 1. 2013.  
16. Rawat, A., S. Sharma, and R. Sushil, VANET: security attacks and its possible solutions. 
Journal of 
17. Information and Operations Management, 2012. 3(1): p. 301-304. 
18. Hasrouny, H., et al., VANet security challenges and solutions: A survey. Vehicular 
Communications, 2017. 7: p. 7-20. 
19. Raya, M. and J.-P. Hubaux. The security of vehicular ad hoc networks. in Proceedings of 
the 3rd ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks. 2005. ACM.19. 
Grover, J., et al., Performance evaluation and detection of sybil attacks in vehicular ad-
hoc networks, in Recent Trends in Network Security and Applications. 2010, Springer. p. 
473-482. 
20. Haseeb, K., et al., A Survey of VANET’s Authentication. Islamia College Peshawar, 
Pakistan, 2010. 
21. Yu, B., C.-Z. Xu, and B. Xiao, Detecting sybil attacks in vanets. Journal of Parallel and 
Distributed Computing, 2013. 73(6): p. 746-756. 
22. Grover, J., M. Gaur, and V. Laxmi, Sybil Attack in VANETs. Security of Self-
Organizing Networks: MANET, WSN, WMN, VANET, 2010: p. 269. 
23. Park, S., et al. Defense against sybil attack in vehicular ad hoc network based on roadside 
unit support. in Military Communications Conference, 2009. MILCOM 2009. IEEE. 
2009. IEEE.  
24. Guette, G. and B. Ducourthial. On the Sybil attack detection in VANET. in Mobile 
Adhoc and Sensor Systems, 2007. MASS 2007. IEEE International Conference on. 2007. 
IEEE. 
25. Yan, G., S. Olariu, and M.C. Weigle, Providing VANET security through active position 
detection. Computer Communications, 2008. 31(12): p. 2883-2897. 
26. Viswanath, B., et al. Exploring the design space of social network-based sybil defenses. 
In Communication Systems and Networks (COMSNETS), 2012 Fourth International 
Conference on. 2012. IEEE. 
27. Xiao, B., B. Yu, and C. Gao. Detection and localization of sybil nodes in VANETs. in 
Proceedings of the 2006 workshop on Dependability issues in wireless ad hoc networks 
and sensor networks. 2006. ACM. 
28. Yan, G., et al. Active position security through dynamically tunable radar. in Mobile 
Adhoc and Sensor Systems (MASS), 2010 IEEE 7th International Conference on. 2010. 
IEEE. 
29. Rahbari, M. and M.A.J. Jamali, Efficient detection of sybil attack based on cryptography 
in VANET. arXiv preprint arXiv:1112.2257, 2011. 
30. Studer, A., et al. TACKing together efficient authentication, revocation, and privacy in 
VANETs. In Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks, 2009. 
SECON'09. 6th Annual IEEE Communications Society Conference on. 2009. IEEE. 
31. Chang, S., et al., Footprint: Detecting sybil attacks in urban vehicular networks. Parallel 
and Distributed Systems, IEEE Transactions on, 2012. 23(6): p. 1103-1114. 
32. Park, S., et al., Defense against Sybil attack in the initial deployment stage of vehicular 
ad hoc network based on roadside unit support. Security and Communication Networks, 
2013. 6(4): p. 523- 538. 
33. Zhou, T., et al., P2DAP—Sybil attacks detection in vehicular ad hoc networks. Selected 
Areas in Communications, IEEE Journal on, 2011. 29(3): p. 582-594. 
34. Rogaway, P. and T. Shrimpton. Cryptographic hash-function basics: Definitions, 
implications, and separations for preimage resistance, second-preimage resistance, and 
collision resistance. in Fast Software Encryption. 2004. Springer. 
